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Abstract
Michel Foucault acknowledged that the Reformation was a pastoral battle and a reorganization of
pastoral power. He did not, however, analyze Protestantism much further. This article broadens the
scope of critical research on Protestantism, focusing on Lutheranism. Preaching is a fruitful way to
overcome overemphasis on confession. In this endeavor I apply Foucault’s concept of “master’s
discourse.” I argue that while, in Lutheranism, conversion through comprehensive soul-searching is
an individual matter, at the same time it relies on technologies aimed at a collective audience, such
as preaching. Since preaching is divine speech, the Lutheran priest wields enormous spiritual
power: the preacher is the truth-teller and the subject is required to listen to and internalize the
proclaimed truth, instead of confessing their sins.
Introduction
Michel Foucault distinguished three types of power relations: first, the legal system pertaining to
the sovereign, territorial state; second, the disciplinary devices related to controlling the bodies of
the subjects and put into practice via police, medical, and penitentiary techniques; and third, the
apparatus of security pertaining to population and the practice he calls “the government of the
living,” in which individuals are subjected to procedures of truth-telling (Foucault 2009, 6–79;
2014b). Governmental techniques are derived from the church. The Christian pastorate and its
guidance of souls towards salvation became the model of political government during the sixteenth
century when the state adopted forms of power peculiar to the church (Dean 2010).
In a nutshell, “pastoral power” is both an individualizing and totalizing technique that is
concerned with the individual and the collective. It is “economic” in the sense that it is derived from
the oikos; instead of coercion, legislative or sovereign power, pastoral power is essentially
administration of human beings, things and wealth (Foucault 2009, 94–97, 103, 205–206; also
Agamben 2011, 110–111). According to the economic paradigm, power is less a confrontation
between two or more adversaries than a question of guidance (Foucault 1982, 789). Integral to
pastoral power is thus the conduct of conduct: how one molds oneself into a subject, that is,
subjectivation (Dean 2010, 18).
Giorgio Agamben (2011) shows that this concept has certainly helped us understand the
genealogy and the peculiar nature of modern governmental power. As one dimension, he analyzes
priesthood (ministerium and officium) as a paradigm for modern public office (Agamben 2013; also
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Dean 2017).1 Other applications of pastoral power vary from medical (Mayes 2009) to leadership
studies (Niesche 2011). On the other hand, as Jeremy Carrette (2000, 28, 38) has pointed out,
because Foucault’s focus was on the patristic period (ca. 100–450 CE) and the consequences of
events such as the Lateran Council in 1215, a legion of important theological and historical
transformations were ignored or mentioned only in passing. Foucault acknowledged that teaching,
preaching, confession, and spiritual guidance are different forms of the pastoral, but he
overemphasized the idea of confession, resulting in blindness to other facets of Christianity
(Foucault 2005, 363; Carrette 2000, 39; Elden 2005).
Consequently, although Foucault (2009, 149–150) acknowledged that the Reformation was “a
profound reorganization of pastoral power” and “a great pastoral battle,” it was left on the margins
of his oeuvre. Despite occasional hints as to what an investigation of Protestant forms of pastoral
power might comprise, these ideas were never brought to fruition because he moved on to discuss
how political power incorporated pastoral techniques. Alas, his focus of the relation between
religion and politics was mainly on the state, with the strong, centralized secular French state as the
primary example (Rosenthal 2009, 63–65).
The purpose of the article is to broaden the scope of critical research on Protestantism,
focusing on Lutheranism. In Protestantism pastoral power took forms that were significantly
different than those developed under the auspices of the Catholic Church. To illustrate this
development, I discuss two studies on Protestant pastoral power by Alistair Mutch (2017; McKinley
and Mutch 2015) and Christina Petterson (2014). The former has analyzed Scottish
Presbyterianism, while the latter has examined Danish Lutheranism in Greenland. Drawing on these
two studies, I conceptualize Lutheran pastoral power in terms of preaching. In this endeavor I apply
Foucault’s concept of “master’s discourse.” My claim is that considering preaching is a fruitful way
to overcome the overemphasis on confession. I pay particular attention to how Lutheran pastoral
power is exercised. Instead of a historical analysis of practices writ large in society, my theoretical
focus is on how a Lutheran priest wields power when preaching, and what kind of subjectivation
this involves.
I seek to show that pastoral power is a different combination of practices in Lutheranism than
in Catholicism. While the conversion of the individual through comprehensive soul-searching is
strictly a private matter, it depends heavily on technologies aimed at the congregation as a
collective, such as preaching. Moreover, the confessional roles are switched: the preacher is the
truth-teller and the subject is required to listen and internalize the proclaimed truth. This is
1 In Agamben’s reading, office is a secularized rationalization of priesthood in the providential oikonomia: the priest as
the agent of cultic practice effectuates the divine government by distributing grace via liturgical (i.e. public) acts.
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important because the tension between the individual and the socio-political structure is essential to
governmental techniques.
In the first section I analyze the most crucial elements of pastoral power. Next, I look at the
place of the Reformation in Foucault’s thinking and move on to discuss Scottish Presbyterianism
and Danish Lutheranism. The topic of the third and fourth sections is preaching as a form of
Lutheran pastoral power. The third section focuses the role of preaching in Lutheranism, while the
fourth one examines preaching as master’s discourse. While concepts such as “Lutheran” and
“Lutheranism” can also be problematic, it is important to note that my treatment of the topic is
based on Martin Luther’s works (or commentaries of his writings), the Augsburg Confession (CA)
and the Large Catechism (LC).
Pastoral power and the rupture within
Foucault (2009, 129) argues that “power of a pastoral type” sprung from the pre-Christian East,
consolidated within the Christian churches, and subsequently spread into the whole social body.
This development culminated in the modern welfare state as the shepherd that guided its population
towards wellbeing. Because detailed knowledge of the flock is needed, revealing the truth about
oneself is a key feature (Foucault 1982, 783–784). Initially the phenomenon pertained to sex, as it
was seen as a fundamental duty to pass everything to do with it “through the endless mill of
speech”— i.e., confession (Foucault 1978, 21). The urge to confess became a defining characteristic
of modern power to such a degree that “Western man has become a confessing animal” (Foucault
1978, 59; Bernauer 2005, 561–562).
Pastoral power means conducting and guiding people, watching and urging them a step at a
time all through their existence (Foucault 2009, 165). In accordance with the figure of the shepherd,
the priest is someone who takes care of his “flock”; he keeps watch, treats the injured and guides
them along the path of salvation (Foucault 1979, 230, 237–238; 2009, 127). Care and nurture of the
flock—“multiplicity in movement”—is more important than protecting a clearly defined territory
(Dean 2010, 91).
There are three elements peculiar to pastoral power.2 First, the priest and his “sheep” are
bound together by a complex web of reciprocities. They have a common destiny, which results in
joint responsibility. The priest needs to guarantee the salvation of everyone together; no sheep shall
be lost. Each individual personally submits to the shepherd who has to be aware of the state, needs,
and acts, not only of the whole flock, but also of each “sheep” – omnes et singulatim (Foucault
2 For a more comprehensive discussion of the elements see Tilli (2013, 47–58).
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1979, 230, 237–238; 2009, 128, 175). The priest is accountable for his sheep at any time; whatever
comes to pass to them is to be held happening (or being done) to himself. The priest must repent his
own deficiencies with the purpose of keeping himself humble for the sake of the flock. As a result,
the pastor acts in a subtle economy of merit and fault that he manages but in the end is decided by
God (Foucault 2009, 169–173).
As regards the second crucial element, self-examination, the purpose is not self-awareness to
assure self-mastery, but to unveil to the director the depths of the soul, the truth about oneself to
ensure subordination (Foucault 2009, 183; 2014a, 92; 1993, 210–211). Continuity is vital: the sheep
must be led through any rough passage victoriously, without leaving them for a second. Being
guided is a state, and one is hopelessly lost if one tries to free oneself from it; in pastoral power the
aim of obedience is obedience (Foucault 2009, 177). Simply put, it is a combination of productive
and repressive power that produces individuals precisely in order to block off individuality (Caputo
2004, 128; see Foucault 1984, 32–40).
Third, pastoral power culminates in self-renunciation: there can be no truth without one
becoming other than oneself (Foucault 2005, 15, 254–257). There thus is a break within the subject.
This dimension of Christian subjectivation can be examined using the concept of metanoia,3 which
Metanoia means a radical change of the soul, regret of past sins, and a rebirth. It refers to the
movement of the soul towards itself in order to gain access to truth about oneself and to make it
known to the “orthogonal gaze of God”—to be asked to be forgiven (Foucault 2014b, 128–129,
133; 2005, 255–256). One thus needs to testify against the old self to reach salvation (Foucault
1997, 242; 2010, 359). As Kenneth Burke (1970, 190–192, 200–201) has pointed out, self-
mortification is an integral element of Christian governance; with one aspect believers keep saying
no to another aspect of themselves.4
Foucault devoted his attention to two main techniques of metanoia, namely exomologesis and
exagoreusis. The former originates from early Christianity. Someone who had committed a serious
sin could enter the order of penitents through almsgiving, fasting, and enduring public humiliation.
This involved the laying on of hands, having one’s head shaved, and donning a hair shirt and ashes.
Chloë Taylor (2009, 19) has noted that exomologesis was often seen through a medical metaphor: to
heal a wound, one must first expose it to a physician. Similarly, to rid oneself of the corruption of
3 The idea has secular origins in the physical motion of turning. As a rhetorical figure, metanoia refers to modification
of a statement by withdrawing and expressing it in a better way (Myers 2011, 8). As a spiritual concept, it refers to
conversion or turning one’s soul to the divine (Peace 1999, 346–347).
4 Foucault (2001, 139) stresses that the “form” of metanoia is spiral: the more we discover the truth about ourselves, the
more we have to renounce ourselves; and the more we want to renounce ourselves, the more we need to bring to light
the reality of ourselves.
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the flesh one must first show it to the public, that is, to acknowledge the truth about oneself and
destroy it symbolically. To summarize, occurring at the end of the period of penitence,
exomologesis is a manifestation of one’s status as a sinner and a visual indication of remorse
(Foucault 2014b, 201–202, 209–210, 212; see also Taylor 2009, 19–20).
Exagoreusis, in turn, denotes permanent avowal of oneself, “the perpetual putting oneself into
discourse” (Foucault 2014b, 307). The focus is on thoughts, wishes, and desires; everything that
enters one’s mind at a given moment is to be tested. It is crucial to know whether what is happening
within oneself comes from God, other people, or Satan. In other words, exagoreusis is a linguistic
activity that purports to establish a relationship to the self that is as analytical and detailed as
possible, by meticulously analyzing the inner workings of the mind in order to equip one against the
internal other (Foucault 2014a, 164–165).
The master to whom thoughts are verbalized is integral. The believer is lost without a guide
who assesses the results of the exegesis of the self, absolves the penitent and assigns penance. It is
also important to note that the “endless mill of speech” is based on a link between the text and the
self. There is an obligation to believe in the scripturally revealed truth, but at the same time it is
important to discover a truth within the self. As a result, the two dimensions condition each other: “I
must know my truth to adhere to the truth of the text, and it is the truth of the text that is going to
guide me in the search I pursue among the secrets of my conscience” (Foucault 2014a, 166–168). In
this process the priest offers the truth (of the text) as a metaphorical mirror in which the subject can
see their own reflection (Foucault 2005, 14–17, 25–30, 255–256, 408).
In this way we have a non-discursive and a discursive indication of repentance. The two
technologies also include corresponding regimes of truth. Exomologesis is the ontological pole,
whereas exagoreusis is the epistemological pole of metanoia (Foucault 1993, 222; 2014b, 212,
307). Despite their differences, they have an important trait in common: dramatic or verbalized
disclosure and the renunciation of the self (cf. Bernauer and Mahon 2005, 166). What is revealed is
rejected.
In what Foucault held as a formative moment, the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 decreed
that every Christian must confess all of their sins at least once a year.5 This cemented verbal
confession, exagoreusis, as a practice whereby people became willing agents of their own
submission (Foucault 2014b, 211; Heinämäki 2017, 134). It meant that the exegesis of both the text
and the self were to be practiced under the strict control of the Catholic Church. From now on
salvation was negotiated with a priest who represented God and who was to have a complete control
5 The canon in question (21) was not completely new; it merely confirmed existing custom and legislation.
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of the subject’s will (Beard 2007, 28–29). The obligation was subsequently given a legal emphasis,
which contributed significantly to what we now know as Protestantism (Stroumsa 1999, 167, 170,
175).
Towards Protestant pastoral power
For Foucault (1982, 782) the movements which took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
and were mainly expressed through the Reformation should be analyzed as a great crisis of Western
subjectivity:
It seems to me that what we see during the Reformation was of course a refusal of the
Church’s authority in its institutional structure; this was the refusal to submit the
hermeneutics that one practiced on the text to a dogmatic institutional authority; it was also a
refusal to submit the hermeneutics of the self to the jurisdictional authority of the priest within
an institution or a sacrament such as penance. Freeing both the hermeneutics of the text and
the hermeneutics of the self: that is what Protestantism achieved. (Foucault 2014a, 92, 168)
In this way, for Foucault, the protest of Protestantism pertained to the ways in which the Christian
subject was molded. The key issue was internalization: the truth of the text is what one should find
within oneself, and conversely what one finds within oneself should be the truth of the text, without
the obligation to confess—and to submit one’s salvation—to a clerical authority (Foucault 2014a,
169). Or, in the words of Kenneth S. Rothwell (1988, 81), the Reformation resulted in relocation of
power of unimpeachable authority to the impeachable self—“the ordeal of the individual self.” The
question of how Christians were to be governed led to a profound reorganization of pastoral power
(Foucault 2009, 150).
It is worth noting that Luther’s attitude to confession was complex, to say the least. The
Reformer held that obligatory confession had “tyrannical” qualities reminiscent of “rape,” thus
being contrary to his emphasis on justification by faith (Taylor 2009, 63). Moreover, because
confession had become a compulsory routine, it was unlikely that it would be genuine speech
reflecting the truth (Springer 2017, 99). However, Luther regarded confession as useful as long as it
took place voluntarily and pertained only to sins that “oppressed most grievously” (quoted in Barth
2013, 250; CA XI). In any case, as a result of Luther’s and other reformers’ stances, the institutional
and sacramental role of auricular confession diminished gradually but steadily (Barth 2013, 250–
251; Bayer 2008, 269).
In Foucault’s reading this had two consequences. First, due to the accumulated effects of the
Protestant and Catholic reformations, pastoral technologies increasingly intervened in everyday life
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(Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer, and Thaning 2016, 265). A comprehensive apparatus of self-
examination and control gained ground. From the early seventeenth century onwards, the modern
state began to take shape, taking on the pastoral function. Foucault describes the spread of clerical
practices beyond their ecclesiastical context as “in-depth Christianization” of society (Foucault
2003, 177; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 175–176). Second, importantly for the matter at hand,
pastoral power practiced within the church transformed. In Catholic countries the role of the
confessor and private confession strengthened with the Catholic Reformation (Foucault 2003, 177).
In Protestant countries, spiritual direction evolved differently. This is unfortunately the point where
Foucault stopped. Though he mentioned that the “reformed pastorate” was hierarchically supple and
meticulous while the “Counter-Reformation type” was hierarchized and centralized, he did not take
these ideas further (Foucault 2003, 184; 2009, 149).
Recent research has begun to fill this gap. Mutch (2017, 83; also McKinlay and Mutch 2015)
discussed “the fissiparous tendencies” of Protestantism. He traces three distinctive traditions in
from the earliest days of the Reformation, namely Episcopalianism, Lutheranism, and Reformed
Protestantism, each of which developed their own religious and social practices. Of these Mutch has
focused on the Reformed tradition, Scottish Presbyterianism in particular. Examination,
accountability, and organizing as good emerge as the key dimensions of Presbyterian pastoral
power. Examination is a thread that runs throughout the church, on an individual and collective
level. Everyone was to keep a confessional diary, members of a church examined each other’s
conduct, and parishes were visited regularly by a committee of the presbytery (Mutch 2017, 85). As
Mutch (89) notes, while in confession the focus was on counting the sins of the laity, with
visitations the Reformed tradition turned more attention to the clergy.
Another particular feature of the Scottish Presbyterian polity was the idea of keeping record
and being accountable. Public disciplining of sins was accompanied with a scrupulous (covert)
process of arriving at verdicts that mirrored secular legal practices. The elders looked for signs of
infraction of church discipline and individual adherents were made accountable before the church
session (McKinlay and Mutch 2015, 250). Since communion was available only to those judged
worthy of it, one’s spiritual record was of crucial importance. Accountability pertained to financial
matters, which were to be taken care of with piety (Mutch 2017, 86–87). The third prominent
Presbyterian theme was an emphasis on order. Order (and organizing) were valued as good in their
own right, a mark of the faithful, and even a religious goal to be achieved (88–89).
This analysis of Scottish Presbyterianism illustrates the meticulous character of Protestant
pastoral power. While the clergy indeed was hierarchically supple and lay involvement heavy,
mechanisms of control defined the existence of a believer. Instead of regular confession of sins,
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one’s life was regulated and calculated in a manner perhaps even more pervasive than in the
Catholic Church. The economic nature of pastoral power was not without historical consequences.
By creating a peculiar type of subject, “accountable creatures” accustomed to systemic
accountability, Scottish Presbyterianism contributed significantly to the development of capitalism
(McKinlay and Mutch 2015).
Christina Petterson (2014), in turn, has examined Lutheranism’s role in the Danish
colonization of Greenland. She shows how incessant study of catechism replaced pastoral care. A
process of colonization entailed subjectivation and the identity of indigenous population was
transformed. In the course of the seventeenth century, Lutheran doctrine was deployed to create a
clearly defined social structure.6 Drawing on Luther’s Haustafel and the catechism, the focus of
Lutheran instruction in Greenland was on propagating a family unit in which the proper relationship
to parents was taken as a point of departure for all authority. A tripartite order for fostering
subjectivities emerged, based on patriarchy and hierarchy: king–subjects, minister–disciples, and
parents–children. The parents teach and look after their “children,” and they all serve God by
obeying the master. This provided an insight into the duties of the individual and a model for proper
societal relations (Petterson 2014, 87–88).
Writing was a way for the new elite individuals (selected by missionaries) to make sense of
themselves as well as to produce abstractions of Greenlandic identity. It also carried an absolute
authority due to its connection to both scripture and the power structures it enabled via controlled
access to education and training (185–186). However, while learning to read and write, the
Greenlanders were presented with an image of themselves and their traditions as false, backward,
and superstitious in contrast to the Lutheran rational order. The Greenlanders were inculcated into
the Lutheran model of society with a textually generated sense of self that was essentially based on
estrangement (112–113, 150). In the Protestant view, nature is the realm of ecclesiastical
civilization in which indigenous practices have no place. Thus, in order to enter into the Protestant
framework, the former lifestyle had to be renounced (85). The Lutheran practice is both a
sanctification of the private sphere and a declericalization of Christian instruction, as well as a
dissemination of the pastoral into the capillaries of everyday life (88).
6 According to Lutheran societal thought, God governs the world through law and spirit. In the secular realm, consisting
of politia, oeconomia, and ecclesia (the institutional church), law and authority govern. In contrast, in the spiritual
realm, God rules through the word and the spirit. Christians belong to both: as earthly creatures to the secular realm and
as Christians to the spiritual one (Luther 1961, 366–373; Barth 2013, 313–348). The two realms must be kept separate
while acknowledging that they are both instituted by God. All authorities are “fathers” who administer their “houses”
based on the power vested in them by God (LC 150–151).
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Elisa Heinämäki (2017, 138; also Rosenthal 2009, 65–67) has observed that because in
Lutheranism confession is no longer a personal act but refers to the institutionally organized whole
of believers, “the general confessional apparatus,” it became an instrument for unifying the nation.
Confessional uniformity was understood to be the best way to construct political identity; thus, the
catechism also functioned as an important technique in “confessionalization of the laity” (see
Ihalainen 2005, 583–588). Petterson’s analysis of Lutheran Danish colonialism testifies to how a
Lutheran religious technique spread beyond its ecclesiastical context in practice. Not only Catholic
confessional practices contributed to the profound Christianization of society.
Foucault (2009, 95) asserted that an essential trend in the spread of “governmentality” has
been the economization of power. To govern means exercising supervision and control over one’s
subjects, wealth, and the conduct of all and each, as attentively as a father watches over his
household and goods. Initially management of the family provided a model for governing, but
during the eighteenth century family transformed into an element within the population and a source
of knowledge for state administration (104–105). In the sphere of religion, however, it remained
first and foremost a paradigm of power. The examples discussed in this section shed light on
Foucault’s claim from a Protestant viewpoint.
In Scottish Presbyterianism, one’s personal, spiritual, and collective ecclesiastical life was
subjected to different forms of “bookkeeping” – an economy of merits and faults – in ways that
imbued everyday existence with economic practices. In Danish Lutheranism, the economic model
was present as the household paradigm that functioned as the basis for societal authority. It was a
hierarchal society of masters and subordinates, an order in which transgressions were seen as
rebellion against God. However, although the Danish and the Scottish case studies both contain
acute observations about Protestant pastoral power, an important aspect has not been examined thus
far, namely proclamation of the Word. Next, I analyze Lutheran pastoral power from the
perspective of preaching.
The role of preaching in Lutheran theology
The Reformation was marked by a war of words: understandings of language and its use were
central (Vind 2017). Regardless of how the reformers gained their new theological insights,
sermons were the means of bringing their doctrines directly to their followers in the vernacular and
applying these doctrines to the needs of the people. The pulpit7 was perhaps the most important
7 The shift towards preaching was also visible in the architecture and arrangement of Lutheran churches, such as the
increased visibility of the pulpit and accessibility of the altar table (White 1989).
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means of communicating information in the sixteenth century. The role of the sermons in making
the Reformation a mass movement can scarcely be overestimated—the spread of printing
technology hastened their diffusion. (Grimm 1958, 50; see Ihalainen 2003). The reformers used
them to pit the spiritual and scriptural against the temporal and thus opened up an ideological space,
a discursive framework, in which to pose alternative forms of conduct and thought, with a number
of moral obligations (Wuthnow 1989, 149–150).
It is no exaggeration to claim that the Protestant Reformation would not have been possible
without preaching, which is emphasized in Lutheran theology. The doctrinal basis is explained in
the Augsburg Confession (IV–V). Justification before God by one’s own strength or works is not
possible; one is justified only through faith, which is engendered by the Holy Spirit in those who
hear the word. For this purpose “the Ministry of Teaching the Gospel and administering the
Sacraments” was instituted (CA V). In a nutshell, preaching produces faith, the only criteria for
salvation.
Lutheran metanoia consists of two stages. First, contrition, that is, terrors smiting the
conscience through the knowledge of sin. Second, the gospel gives birth to faith and delivers the
conscience from terrors (CA XII). Repentance is thus a private and internal event caused by
preaching. Drawing on this scheme, the preacher’s first step is to teach penitence and proclaim the
law. However, stopping at sin would amount to wounding without healing. As the second step, the
promise of forgiveness by which faith is aroused must also be preached (Luther 1961, 55–73). The
Lutheran irony is thus that preaching intensifies the very sense of guilt for which it provides
absolution (Burke 1970, 234). Or, in Foucauldian terms, preaching attempts to mend the rift within
the subject it has created.
How, then, are the rupture and the subsequent rebirth manifested in Lutheranism? Because of
its aversion to obligatory confession and acts of satisfaction in justification, Lutheranism espouses a
peculiar way of manifesting one’s status as a sinner. Good works follow as fruits of repentance, but
they cannot merit forgiveness of sins (CA XII, XX). The Lutheran paradox is that despite the
seemingly heavy emphasis on ethical behavior, lack of good deeds is not necessarily a sign of
anything; it is only faith that counts. Good works are necessary but not sufficient for salvation
(Hendrix 2010, 50). Instead of separate deeds to make up for sinful actions, the believer’s entire life
should be of repentance (Luther’s Thesis I). That is, instead of dramatic (exomologesis) or verbal
(exagoreusis) rituals, everyday existence is to be filled with renunciation of the self.
In contrast, as Max Weber (2001, 43–45) has famously argued, this led to an understanding
that one could attain salvation by accepting one’s calling as divine ordinance and fulfilling one’s
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everyday duties diligently. According to the Lutheran ethic, one could ensure one’s salvation by
fulfilling one’s daily vocation. For Foucault (2011, 247) the meaning of the break represented by
Luther and the Reformation consists precisely in the acceptance that, instead of ascesis in the
confines of a monastery, access to the world above is defined by a life that conforms to existence in
the world below.
In the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, all Christians are priests in the sense that no
occupation is holier than another, but the church chooses its preachers (Luther 1961, 345–346).
Once selected, the spiritual fathers who “govern and guide by the Word of God” are ranked highly
in the Lutheran hierarchy of authority (LC 164–167): preachers, like parents or political leaders,
carry out godly duties; priests, however, are to be esteemed twice as much as “temporal fathers”
(Barth 2013, 252–255).
The office of preaching serves the authorities by keeping the public peace, but also by
protesting against inappropriate behavior by the political authorities (Barth 2013, 334). Although
they will most likely be faced with resistance and contempt, preachers should not shy from their
obligation to remind temporal authorities of their duty to meet the bodily and spiritual needs of their
subjects (LC 164–167). Indeed, Luther often complains of their corrupt nature; more often than not,
they are “fools” with “a perverse mind” (Luther 1961, 383–384, 395; LC 37). The preacher,
however, should never resort to violence or coercion. The priest’s power lies in God’s word alone,
because Christians can be ruled only by it—“political impotence” is part of the priest’s  spiritual
power (Luther 1961, 392; quoted in Barth 2013, 331).
Although Foucault did not analyze Protestantism in detail, he provided a conceptual apparatus
for understanding Lutheran pastoral power in terms of preaching. This pertains to what he called
“master’s discourse” (Foucault 2005, 348). In this undertaking I follow Christina Petterson (2014,
74) who designates the Lutheran shepherd as “master” in order to underline the reach of pastoral
power, particularly in issues related to gender, class and race, in the system of domination
propagated by the catechism. I use the concept here to tease out what kind of power technique
preaching is.
Lutheran pastoral power: preaching as master’s discourse
Master’s discourse means a discourse of truth that characterizes a person who is responsible for
directing others verbally (Foucault 2010, 6, 43; 2005, 164).8 It consists of two roles, the master and
8 In Foucault’s thought rhetoric and parrhesia are opposed to each other. Rhetoric does not entail a bond between the
speaker and the content, but aims to establish one between the content and the audience. It enables the speaker to say
something that may not be what he thinks, but whose effect will produce convictions, induce conduct or instill belief in
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the disciple(s), and is deployed in terms of parrhesia. It must obey the principle of parrhesia if the
speaker wants the truth of what is said to become the subjectivized true discourse of the disciple
(Foucault 2005, 366, 368).
Parrhesia has three distinctive characteristics. The first one is frankness. The one who uses
parrhesia, the parrhesiastes, uses only direct words and forms of expression: acting on other people
by showing them as clearly as possible what he or she actually believes. Second, truthfulness is
integral to parrhesia. Speakers bind themselves to the content as well as to the act of declaring it—
ethos is an integral part of parrhesia (Foucault 2010, 65; 2011, 25). This, in turn, presupposes that
the speaker has moral and social qualities required for conveying the truth to others, such as
courage. The third trait is the risk involved in telling the truth. Unlike ordinary performative acts,
parrhesia does not produce codified effects; it opens up an unspecified risk (Foucault 2010, 62–64).
It can mean losing friendship or popularity, even life, but parrhesiastes would rather be truth-tellers
than be untrue to themselves and let the truth go unsaid (Foucault 2001, 12, 14–17; 2010, 56, 178–
180). To sum up, parrhesia is a discourse of truth that is constantly testing itself in both the person
who delivers it and the person to whom it is addressed (Foucault 2010, 326–327).
In addition to parrhesia, Foucault discusses three other forms of truth-telling. The first one is
prophecy. The prophet tells the truth by being a mouthpiece for a voice which speaks from
elsewhere and proclaims a fate to come (Foucault 2011, 14–16, 25). Second, the sage does speak in
his own name, but the difference is that he is wise in and for himself. Nothing obliges the sage to
demonstrate or teach his wisdom to others (17–18). Third, the technician possesses knowledge
(practical or theoretical) that he is capable of teaching to others. In contrast to the sage, like the
prophet, the technician has a duty to pass on to others what he knows. Unlike the other truth-tellers,
however, the teacher does this without a risk to his life (24–25). Common to all four modes of
speech is that truth is a reflection of subjective experience; the speakers stand for their truth.9
In early Christianity parrhesia was most often used to denote trust and confidence in God’s
love as well as the courageous attitude of whoever preaches the gospel (Foucault 2011, 229–331).
The concept is particularly visible in Acts and Letters where it is used by two different human
the audience. Parrhesia, on the other hand, involves a constitutive bond between the speaker and what is said, and
through the effect of the truth, makes it possible for the bond between the speaker and the audience to be broken.
(Foucault 2011, 13–14.) From the perspective of rhetorical theory, such a strict distinction is open to criticism. For
instance, what for Foucault constituted a sincere parrhesia might as well be feigned, and what he sees as rhetorically
artless is often highly rhetorical (Walzer 2013).
9 These “modes of veridiction” were often combined with each other (Foucault 2011, 26–27). Socrates, for example,
had at the same time qualities related to all of them. Medieval Christianity, in turn, united parrhesia and prophecy in the
figure of the preacher who spoke of the Last Judgment and told with parrhesia people what their sins were and how
they had to change their lives (29).
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agents (the Apostles and all Christians in general) towards three different audiences (persecution
and trials, other Christians, and God). Here the term means bold speech, trust in God, intimacy
among Christians, openness towards God, and intimacy with God, all translated usually into Latin
as fiducia (Szakolczai 2003, 234–239). In relation to the topic of the present article, it is important
to note that preaching is a peculiar type of parrhesia. The preacher believes the truth he declares,
but the link to scripture denotes a salient difference. The preacher is not telling merely a personal
truth; the main task is to teach the revealed Word (McFarlan et al. 2011, 413).
However, with the increasing stress on authority and asceticism in Christian practice and
institutions, these meanings were replaced by obedience. One had to fear God and recognize the
necessity of submitting to the divine will and to the will representing God. Now parrhesia as
confidence in God appears as arrogant and presumptuous self-confidence, incompatible with the
severe gaze one must focus on oneself (Foucault 2011, 333–334; Szakolczai 2003, 239–240). As a
result, parrhesia passed from referring to the master’s obligation to tell the disciple what is true to
the latter’s obligation to tell the master the truth about themselves (Foucault 2010, 47, 348). In
Foucault’s (2011, 339) understanding, the pastoral institutions of Christianity developed around this
aspect.
A different kind of pastoral power is revealed in Luther’s understanding of preaching. To
begin with, his criticism of the Catholic Church was visible in his rendition of parrhesia. He
translated the concept into German using the neologism Freidigkeit that merges freedom (Freiheit)
and brazenness (Frechheit) (Bussie 2017, 112; see Nagel 2018). Luther’s usage of parrhesia to
describe preaching is illustrative: “Paulus aber bleib zwey jar in seinem eigen Gedinge / vnd nam
auff alle die zu jm einkamen / prediget das reich Gottes / vnd lerete von dem Herrn Jhesu / mit aller
Freidigkeit vnuerbotten.”10 Here, as elsewhere (e.g., Acts 4:29; 1 John 2:28, 3:21, 4:17; Hebr. 4:16),
Luther uses the concept to refer to speaking God’s word with Freidigkeit.
In line with his theological emphasis, Luther’s neologism introduced a new quality to the
Latin fiducia used in the Vulgate. In addition to confidence, fiducia denotes mutual trust and
reliance. In the Roman law it referred to a certain type of contract.11 Luther’s Freidigkeit, in turn,
emphasizes freedom: brazen confidence to proclaim the truth of gospel freely.12 Thus Luther added
an element of courageous autonomy to preaching (see Springer 2017, 99–100). A Lutheran preacher
10 “And Paul dwelt two whole years in his own hired house, and received all that came in unto him, preaching the
kingdom of God, and teaching those things which concern the Lord Jesus Christ, with all confidence, no man forbidding
him” (Acts 28:30–31).
11 The Latin root fid- denotes “trust,” in Christianity most often “faith.” For the Romans fides denoted a sense of trust
between two parties.
12 Occasionally Luther’s innovativeness lead to misleading translations when Freidigkeit was changed to Freudigkeit
(joy), which loses the reformer’s originality (Kretzmann 1934, 440).
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needs all these qualities, because a sermon is a battleground against powers opposed to God (Barth
2013, 255). In addition, as the word is the only weapon against political authorities, the preacher’s
“own existence is always put in play” (quoted in Barth 2013, 331). As Foucault (2009, 169-173)
stressed, the shepherd must be ready to take on both spiritual and temporal enemies of the flock. In
this sense, a Lutheran preacher is a parrhesiastes par excellence: she or he proclaims an unwelcome
truth to (and by) which the speaker is bound and which may undermine the very relationship that
makes the discourse possible (Foucault 2011, 11–12).
Preaching has another important trait: divine speech (Deus loquens). In the words spoken by
the preacher, “God himself is speaking” (quoted in Wilson 2005, 63; see also Beach 1999, 77–90).
Luther ascribed an almost sacramental quality to the office of preaching (Barth 2013, 251). When
the Word of God is preached, no one is exempted from its benefits (Ngien 2003, 32). However, in
order to remain authoritative, Christianity master’s discourse must be constantly related  to the
fundamental speech, that is, scripture (Foucault 2005, 363).13 This requirement is strict in the
Lutheran context: only when the sermon focuses consistently on Christ and his relation to the given
audience, and proceeds from law to gospel, is it divine speech (Luther 1962, 65–66; Meuser 1983,
12). Thus, the Lutheran preacher is constituted by a double bind. The first one is what Foucault
(2014a, 169) described as the Protestant internalization: the truth of the text must be also his
subjective truth. Second, the content of the proclamation needs to be firmly based on the scriptures.
This has not always been a simple position (see Tilli 2016).
Third, while Luther emphasized the office of preaching, he stressed that “ears alone are the
organs of a Christian”; God requires nothing else (Luther’s Works, Vol. 29, 224). By the same
token, “the church is not a pen-house but a mouth-house” (quoted in Ferry 1990, 271). Dennis
Ngien’s (2003, 32) description is apt: the Lutheran God cannot be seen but only heard. The result is
that the traditional auricular roles prevalent in Catholic confessional techniques are switched: the
main role of the shepherd is to speak, or confess, not to listen to a confession. For the subject the
focus moves from confessing one’s sins to hearkening to the words of a sermon and internalizing
the message in a way that the truth of the text is found in the depths of the soul. Contrary to
Catholicism, here self-examination does not prepare for confession; it incites the subject to suspect
oneself of sins pronounced by the preacher and to purify one’s conduct accordingly (cf. Foucault
1978, 18–35).
 The fact that this aspect was overlooked is probably caused by a transition in Foucault’s work
in relation to speaking and silence. Until the mid-1970s, he predominantly saw Christianity as a
13 For discussion of the divinity of the shepherd, see Foucault (2009, 195–205).
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silencing force, whereas later he described it as a power which demands an utterance (Carrette
2000, 36). The later emphasis guides Foucault’s examination of master’s discourse. He notes that in
philosophy, speech requires the listener’s silence (Foucault 2005, 342). The ear should be open to
what comes from outside; it should be receptive and passive when it meets the logos, to allow the
truth of the master to enter and penetrate the soul (Siisiäinen 2013, 92). Here the guided do not have
to say the truth about themselves; it is necessary and sufficient to keep quiet (Foucault 2005, 363–
364).
However, Foucault’s analysis of the master’s discourse in Christianity was affected by his
emphasis on confessing. Although Foucault (2011, 29, 330–331) acknowledged that preaching was
one historical form of master’s discourse and “an apostolic virtue,” for him, in Christianity
parrhesia pertained first and foremost to confession. He stressed that the common denominator in
the different forms, rules, tactics, and institutions pertaining to Christian spirituality is that people
led towards salvation have to speak the truth about themselves (Foucault 2005, 363). As we have
seen, Lutheran pastoral power is a silencing force rather than a technique to extract truth statements
from the believer. The preacher is now the “endless mill of speech.”
Fourth, while confession takes place privately, preaching is public. Confession directly
involves participation, whereas preaching contains spectators who have distance from the
performance. The audience is addressed simultaneously as a group and as individuals. As regards
the targets of providential guidance, there are at least three “personae” present: the first is the actual
audience present at the service (or reading the sermon afterwards); the second is the implied
audience projected by the sermon (this is the ideal subject the preacher would have his real auditor
become) (see Black 1970); and third, the audience that is rejected or negated in the speech,
implicitly or explicitly (see Wander 1984). Publicity renders preaching intensely political. As
Agamben (2011, 144–149) has emphasized in the footsteps of Erik Peterson, it is precisely the
public character of worship that makes the church political; participation in liturgy founds “the
Christian people” (laos).
 Giorgio Agamben (2011, 68–108) has pointed out that an important feature of the economic
paradigm of power is that reign and government are distinguished yet functionally correlated; God
reigns but does not govern. In Lutheran pastoral power this is related to the distinction between the
Word of God and God—or, in Luther’s own words, “God preached” and “God hidden in majesty.”
The latter remains in solitude, whereas the former is the way God wants to make God’s self known
to and guide to human beings. Although God acts in ways which are not known through the divine
word, for humans God is always clothed in it (Luther 1525, sect. 64; see also Agamben 2011, 284).
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As I have illustrated, in the Lutheran adaptation of the theological and economic paradigm,
governing takes place through preaching. Preachers are overseers, ensuring that society as a whole
leads a godly life, and no sphere or person is beyond their grasp. Thus, the Lutheran conception of
preaching contributed greatly to the dissemination of the pastoral into everyday life. Hence, as
Foucault (2009, 149) notes, the Reformation resulted in a formidable reinforcement of the pastorate.
Conclusion
Pastoral power depends on self-renunciation of the subject: there can be no truth without one
becoming other than oneself, no salvation without a symbolic death and rebirth. Christianity has
deployed two main techniques, exomologesis and exagoreusis, to make the rupture within the
subject manifest. The former is a visual manifestation of remorse, whereas the latter is a verbal
acknowledgement of sinfulness and repentance. In Foucault’s reading, exagoreusis, permanent
putting oneself into discourse, has been decisive for Western subjectivity.
My interpretation of Lutheran pastoral power offers an alternative perspective to Christian
self-renunciation. Based on the theological emphasis, the most important pastoral technique is
preaching. It dramatically transforms the roles assigned to the priest and the subject in Foucauldian
readings derived from Catholicism. The discursive or textual nature of pastoral power is retained,
but it is now the preacher, not the confessing subject, is the truth-teller. The subject must do
comprehensive soul-searching in order to align the truth of the text with the truth of the self. This
was integral to the reorganization of pastoral power caused by the Reformation.
The paradox of becoming a Lutheran subject is that good works are bound to follow from the
metanoic transformation of the self (caused by preaching), but nothing certain can be inferred from
one’s actions. That is to say, Lutheran self-renunciation may or may not have positive ethical
consequences. This severs any necessary link between external manifestation of repentance and the
inner state. In Foucauldian terms, there is no telling from outside what the status of the
subjectivation process is. Although both are expected, no ontological or epistemological
manifestation is required—certainty of salvation is a purely subjective experience (cf. Raffnsøe,
Gudmand-Høyer and Thaning 2016, 405; Martinson 2017, 239–240). In this sense the Lutheran
subject is truly free.
My second point pertains to the role of the priest in the Lutheran economy of salvation. The
paradigm of pastoral power is based on the idea that God is sovereign in the world only through
principles administered and put into practice by the pastorate. The historical manifestations of this
theological and economic paradigm vary within Protestantism. In Scottish Presbyterianism, spiritual
and collective ecclesiastical life was saturated with different ways of being held accountable. In
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Danish Lutheranism, meticulous study of the catechism provided a model for a society of masters
and subordinates. As regards Lutheran preaching, ministers of the word are indispensable because
government of the world according to God’s plan takes place through their parrhesia.
Consequently, although priesthood is not a sacrament or a holy ordinance as in Catholicism, the
Lutheran priest wields enormous spiritual power as a preacher. He or she is the master of masters.
Despite the emphasis on freedom, there is more than a little irony in the historical and
political consequences of the Reformation. First, the close relation between church and state gave
religion enormous power in society, first as Lutheran theologico-political orthodoxy, later in the
form of national churches. Second, as a side of the same coin, despite its potential for criticism, the
spiritual power of a Lutheran priest has often been placed at the disposal of the secular authorities
and their political or military aims. For example, during WWII many Lutheran churches eagerly
took part in the war effort (Bergen 2004).14 Also, in many Protestant, particularly Lutheran,
countries where private confession and pastoral care were replaced by preaching and the
compulsory study of catechism, biopolitical practices such as eugenics were readily accepted and
most successfully implemented (Ojakangas 2015). Third, while the Lutheran subject is not required
to engage in rituals of penance, mundane life as a whole is a de-ritualized site of repentance. Hence,
while the individualizing and totalizing tendencies at work in Lutheran pastoral power are
undoubtedly different from those of Catholic pastoral guidance, they are no less intense.
Finally, I believe Foucault (2014b, 311) was correct to claim that the obligation to tell the
truth about oneself has never ceased to exist in Christian culture, and probably in Western societies
altogether. Based on the findings presented here, I would add that, in a Lutheran context, there is
also a powerful strand of subjectivation that expects the individual to remain silent and listen to the
truth being told.
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